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Abstract
Validating a concept of operation for a complex, safety-critical system (like the National Airspace Sys-
tem) is challenging because of the high dimensionality of the controllable parameters and the inﬁnite number
of states of the system. In this paper, we use statistical modeling techniques to explore the behavior of a
conﬂict detection and resolution algorithm designed for the terminal airspace. These techniques predict the
robustness of the system simulation to both nominal and oﬀ-nominal behaviors within the overall airspace.
They also can be used to evaluate the output of the simulation against recorded airspace data. Additionally,
the techniques carry with them a mathematical value of the worth of each prediction–a statistical uncertainty
for any robustness estimate. Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation (UQ) is the process of quantitative characterization
and ultimately a reduction of uncertainties in complex systems. UQ is important for understanding the
inﬂuence of uncertainties on the behavior of a system and therefore is valuable for design, analysis, and veri-
ﬁcation and validation. In this paper, we apply advanced statistical modeling methodologies and techniques
on an advanced air traﬃc management system, namely the Terminal Tactical Separation Assured Flight
Environment (T-TSAFE). We show initial results for a parameter analysis and safety boundary (envelope)
detection in the high-dimensional parameter space. For our boundary analysis, we developed a new sequen-
tial approach based upon the design of computer experiments, allowing us to incorporate knowledge from
domain experts into our modeling and to determine the most likely boundary shapes and its parameters. We
carried out the analysis on system parameters and describe an initial approach that will allow us to include
time-series inputs, such as the radar track data, into the analysis.
I. Introduction
NASA is developing new tools and procedures that are intended to improve the safety of the nation’s
air transportation system and to replace the legacy conﬂict prediction tools in place today. One promising
NASA concept of operation, the Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment (TSAFE), works in the en
route airspace and uses both ﬂight intent information and dead reckoning to calculate trajectories.1,2 TSAFE
was speciﬁcally designed for conﬂict detection en route, and is part of a larger airspace management system
known as the Automated Airspace Concept.3 Detecting conﬂicts within the terminal airspace can be more
complex than detection within en route airspace, for reasons we will discuss below. NASA has developed
a tactical conﬂict detection and resolution tool speciﬁcally designed for the complexities of the terminal
airspace that is based on TSAFE, called the Terminal Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment, or
Terminal TSAFE (T-TSAFE).4
An important safety goal we focus on in this work is to maintain safe separation between all aircraft.
Maintaining separation in the terminal airspace (near an airport) is much more challenging than maintaining
separation in en route airspace. In the terminal airspace there are higher rates of operational errors, denser
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air traﬃc, frequent large turns, incompletely speciﬁed ﬂight plans, complex sets of separation standards, and
the frequent necessity to operate aircraft purposely near the required separation standards. Terminal airspace
surrounds airports within a radius of about 40 miles. Within terminal airspace, the legal separation standards
are complex, and depend on aircraft weight class, type of approach, visual vs. instrument ﬂight rules, and
whether the aircraft is transitioning to or from en route airspace. Terminal area air traﬃc controllers guide
aircraft as they approach or depart the airport, and must maintain these separation standards. However,
the complexity of terminal airspace has proven diﬃcult for the tactical conﬂict detection systems that are
intended to aid terminal area air traﬃc controllers.
The Terminal Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment (T-TSAFE) that is being developed at
NASA Ames is designed to overcome these diﬃculties. T-TSAFE creates a single predicted trajectory for
each aircraft based on an algorithm that uses available ﬂight intent information. The ﬂight intent information
includes ﬂight plans, area navigation departure routes, site-speciﬁc nominal arrival routes, speed restrictions,
and altitude clearances. Additionally, the separation algorithms in T-TSAFE are governed by a large number
of conﬁguration, aircraft performance (e.g., aircraft weight), and operational parameters. T-TSAFE also
includes a reﬁned set of current, dynamic separation standards for terminal airspace to deﬁne losses of
separation. By combining all of these variables, T-TSAFE is able to predict the future positions of aircraft
and check them for possible conﬂicts with signiﬁcantly fewer false alerts than the current legacy system.4
Obviously, it is important to ensure T-TSAFE is working correctly and produces as few prediction
mistakes as possible, even under oﬀ-nominal conditions or when the normal behavior of the air traﬃc system
changes. Our goal is to work towards the validation of T-TSAFE within this safety-critical system. In
particular, we want to a.) make sure that the system is robust to extreme input conﬁgurations and also to
b.) quantify the eﬀect of uncertainties in the system on the predictions. In order to ensure safe operation
through validation, we must analyze how uncertainties and noise in those parameters inﬂuence the behavior
of T-TSAFE. However, current validation techniques for such systems are usually limited to exploring a
small set of manually selected individual senarios.
Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation (UQ) is an active area of science that seeks to understand the sources of
prediction error in a complex system, and further to quantify and to hopefully reduce these sources of
uncertainty in order to achieve better predictions about the complex system’s behavior.5,6
UQ is important for understanding the inﬂuence of uncertainties in the behavior of the system and
therefore is very valuable for design, analysis and, in particular for the focus of our work, validation of
the system. In order to carry out a UQ analysis for T-TSAFE, it is important to understand interactions
between continuous variables (variables which can have inﬁnitely small variation within their range), discrete
variables (variables which can only take on 1 of n ﬁnite values), and time series variables (variables which can
change their values with time). Systems which depend on a combination of continuous and discrete variables
for their behavior are known as hybrid systems and require a substantial extension to the current state of
the art for a complete analysis.7,8 In this paper, we carry out an initial UQ analysis for T-TSAFE; our
initial results give insight about those conﬁguration parameters which are actually inﬂuential on T-TSAFE’s
capability to detect losses of separation between two aircraft.
A. Separation Assurance
The National Airspace (NAS) is at its performance limit and the number of ﬂights may increase by a factor
of 2 or more by the year 2020.9,10 Researchers on Next Generation Air Traﬃc Control develop approaches
and systems to safely handle the increased number of aircraft in the NAS by using increasingly automated
systems. The important safety goal is to maintain safe separation between all aircraft: usually 3 nmi
horizontal and 1000 feet vertical, referred to as “the hockey puck” (see Figure 1). The terminal airspace
near an airport is much more challenging in terms of density and complexity than en route airspace, and
operating errors are higher. The complexity of terminal airspace has proven diﬃcult for tactical conﬂict
detection systems. Contributing factors to this complexity include the dense air traﬃc, frequent large turns,
incompletely speciﬁed ﬂight plans, a complex set of separation standards, and the frequent necessity to
operate aircraft purposely near the required separation standards.
Accurate and early prediction of any loss of separation (LOS) is necessary to support the controller or for
automated systems. There are three independent layers of separation assurance. The strategic layer focuses
on mid-term conﬂicts (losses of separation) predicted to be between 2 and 20 minutes into the future. The
tactical layer addresses short-term or imminent conﬂicts predicted to occur within 2 minutes. A third layer
of safety is provided by an independent airborne collision avoidance system such as TCAS (Traﬃc Alert
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Figure 1. The aircraft separation “hockey-puck”11
and Collision Avoidance System). TCAS deals with potential collisions less than 45 seconds away. The
tactical layer for en route ﬂights, known as the Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment (TSAFE),
is proposed as a backup system that duplicates a limited set of safety-critical functions of the strategic layer.
TSAFE simpliﬁes the problem of automated separation assurance and provides a safety net for the strategic
layer. Algorithms for the prediction of LOS on all layers are safety-critical and thus require careful analysis
and validation.
B. Details of the T-TSAFE System
The Terminal Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment (T-TSAFE) predicts LOS near airports for
take-oﬀs and landings.12 T-TSAFE encodes all complex terminal separation rules including wake separation.
T-TSAFE uses a novel intent-based algorithm for predicting the trajectories of the aircraft for the next 2
minutes and is implemented in the Java computer language.
The architecture of T-TSAFE is shown in Figure 2. T-TSAFE uses diﬀerent kinds of inputs: static
conﬁguration data (TSAFE properties), static aircraft data (e.g., aircraft weight, climb speed, and other
performance data as given in the Base of Aircraft Data (BADA)13,14), and the actual aircraft track data
including weather information. Track data and weather are time series data. Track data, stored in CTAS’s
cm-sim data format contain the aircraft’s ID and ﬂight number, position, ground speed, altitude, and addi-
tional data in time intervals of 12 seconds (one ATC radar sweep). The weather data contain wind speed,
direction, temperature, and air pressure for a certain location in a 5 km grid and altitude for each hour of
the day.
After reading the static data, T-TSAFE processes the track data and reports potential conﬂicts with
time-to-loss (ttlos) and performs predictions in regular intervals. A utility function read conflicts reads
those reported conﬂicts and produces a data structure for further processing.
Figure 3 shows a typical scenario with two aircraft. The track data originate from an actual LOS scenario
in which we have obscured the airline information. The aircraft track for ﬂight ABC653 is shown in blue,
for XYZ1052 in green. Both aircraft are in ﬁnal descent. The ﬁgure shows the world coordinates in nautical
miles (nmi) in the x and y directions and the altitude in thousands of feet. The red lines connect the
trajectories at points in which there were actual losses of separation; when both aircraft came too close
together and violated the terminal separation rules. This ﬁgure shows that several losses of separation are
detected (numlos); the ﬁrst loss of separation occurs at time ttlos.
C. Statistical Modeling for T-TSAFE
In our study, we investigated how T-TSAFE copes with uncertainties and trajectory prediction (TP) errors.
In general, uncertainties can occur due to:
• intent errors and delays (e.g. pilot doesn’t follow ATC commands),
• errors in the initial conditions (e.g. radar measurements),
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Figure 2. Architecture of TTSAFE
Figure 3. Two aircraft scenario, points at which the aircraft lose separation are connected with red lines.
• environmental uncertainties (e.g. weather),
• and modeling errors (e.g. unknown actual weight of aircraft).
We analyzed how the speciﬁc separation assurance algorithm in T-TSAFE behaves in the presence of these
uncertainties. In general, we consider that all three kinds of inputs to T-TSAFE as shown in Figure 2 can
contain sources of uncertainties. However, in this paper we report only on the uncertainty with respect to
the conﬁguration inputs and to the track data. We will present a more thorough analysis in future work. We
perform both time series analysis and boundary analysis within our study, using techniques only recently
developed within the statistics community.15 In the following section, we ﬁrst give a short introduction into
Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation (UQ). We then overview sensitivity analysis and brieﬂy discuss our boundary
estimation technique. Finally, we describe and report on our experimental in the subsequent sections.
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II. Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation
A. Concepts
Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation(UQ) is the science of quantitative characterization and reduction of uncertainties
in systems. UQ is increasingly becoming an important part of design and analysis of complex computer
and engineering systems.16–18 It provides the ability to assess the quality of computational results and
apply conﬁdence bounds to output metrics, particularly problems in which experimental data is diﬃcult or
impossible to obtain.
Uncertainties from numerous sources can aﬀect the behavior of a complex system, such as:
• Parameter uncertainty, which comes from the model parameters that are inputs to the computer
model, but whose exact values are unknown to experimentalists and cannot be controlled in physical
experiments;
• Structural uncertainty, aka model inadequacy, model bias, or model discrepancy, which comes from
the lack of knowledge of the underlying true physics. It depends on how accurately a mathematical
model describes the true system for a real-life situation, considering the fact that models are almost
always only approximations to reality;
• Algorithmic uncertainty, aka numerical uncertainty, which comes from numerical errors and numerical
approximations per implementation of the computer model. Most models are too complicated to solve
exactly;
• Experimental uncertainty (observation error) which comes from the variability of experimental mea-
surements. UQ is valuable for design analysis and for validation.
In general, there are two types of problems in UQ analysis: forward uncertainty propagation is used for
the analysis of system outputs based on uncertain inputs; the inverse problem is used to assess model and
parameter uncertainty based on the outputs.
Output Variables
Input Variables u
− geometry and physics
− initial conditions
− environment
− operational
Model
Computational
Measures f(u)
Figure 4. Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation
B. Sensitivity Analysis
For the parameter analysis, we are interested in studying how the uncertainty in the output of the system
can be apportioned to diﬀerent sources of uncertainty in its inputs. To do so, we performed sensitivity
analysis on the parameters, and usually uncertainty and parameter sensitivity analysis are run in tandem.
Sensitivity analysis can be useful for a range of purposes, some examples include:
• Testing the robustness of the system in the presence of uncertainty,
• Identifying model inputs that cause signiﬁcant uncertainty in the output thus should therefore be the
focus of further analysis,
• Model simpliﬁcation i.e. ﬁxing model inputs that have no eﬀect on the output,
• Eﬃcient searching for errors in the model.
In models involving many input variables, parameter analysis is an essential ingredient of model building
and quality assurance.
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III. Experiments and Results
A. Experimental Setup: T-TSAFE Harness
For our statistical analysis, we consider T-TSAFE strictly as a black box, i.e., we do not have access to any
of the internal details and variables of the T-TSAFE system. For each experimental trial, we provide T-
TSAFE with perturbed variables to its conﬁguration parameters and to the track data, as shown in Figure 2.
Each of the inputs is parameterized, i.e., it can deviate in a certain way from its original, or nominal value.
Table 1 gives the values perturbed for the static conﬁguration and we discuss our track perturbation below in
subsection C. As the driving scenario, we use—for this study—the two-aircraft scenario shown in Figure 3:
ﬂights ABC653 and XYZ1052 losing safe separation during their descent.
Figure 5 shows our experimental setup. In a ﬁrst step, the variables and parameters that need to be
perturbed (see above) must be speciﬁed by the user. Typically, a range can be given, e.g., the time interval
for invoking the detection algorithm is between 5 seconds and 200 seconds, or variations around the nominal
value, e.g., the aircraft weight w can be perturbed by ±25%, i.e., w = w0 ± 25%.
Based upon this speciﬁcation, our harness generates a number of test cases. Each test case corresponds
to a speciﬁc set of inputs. With those inputs the TTSAFE system is started, and the outputs of interest,
mainly the variables numlos, ttlos and the position and altitude of the ﬁrst detection of LOS (x, y, alt) are
extracted using the utility function read conflicts. After all relevant test cases have been processed, we
perform the statistical data analysis and visualize the results.
cm_sim
weather
Variables to modify
TTSAFE
read_conflicts
    Visualization
Statistical Data Analysis
Testcase Generation
TSafe
properties BADA
Figure 5. Architecture of the TTSAFE Harness
B. Sensitivity Analysis on Conﬁguration Inputs
For the analysis on conﬁguration inputs, we used 14 scalar conﬁguration parameters as shown in Table 1.
Of those, 10 are continuous and 4 variables are discrete. With this parameter deﬁnition, we used a 3-factor
combinatorial exploration19–21 to generate 2467 distinct test cases. For continuous variables, a uniform
distribution within a range of ±25% was approximated using 5 equidistant bins. The discrete conﬁguration
parameters are used to select between varying algorithms for detecting conformance and predicting aircraft
trajectories. We executed T-TSAFE on each of the 2467 test cases and we recorded numlos and ttlos.
For the given experiments and each of the parameter variables, we calculated the standardized regression
coeﬃcient (SRC), a commonly used sensitivity value. Figure 6 shows the corresponding plot. Small circles
show the SRC values, the short lines indicate their variance (which is very low in this case). This plot
6 of 10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Parameter Name Nominal Value Type
MinHorizSepNmi 3 C
aboveFL290AltLevel 1000 C
aboveFL290AltChanging 1000 C
belowFL290AltLevel 1000 C
belowFL290AltChanging 1000 C
CheckPeriodMinutes 1.0 C*
CrossTrackTolerance 0.5 C
AlongTrackTolerance 0.25 C
AltitudeTolerance 200 C
HeadingTolerance 5 C
ConformanceStrategy No default D(2)
ConﬂictDetection No default D(3)
NomTrajSynth No default D(3)
DeadReckonTS No default D(2)
Table 1. TTSAFE conﬁguration parameters perturbed in our experiments. Continuous parameters (C) were
perturbed with a range of ±25% of the nominal value. D(x) denotes a discrete variable with x distinct values.
indicates that only three variables ( MinHorizSepNmi, CheckPeriodMinutes, and ConﬂictDetection) have
SRC values which are substantially larger than 0, meaning that the behavior of T-TSAFE is sensitive to
those variables.
SRC
MinHorizSepNmi CheckPeriodMinutes HeadingTolerance DeadReckonTS
-1
.0
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Figure 6. Sensitivity Analysis Results. Values near zero indicate that the output is insensitive to the input.
Some of the results make sense. For example, MinHorizSepNmi (the minimum allowable horizontal
separation in nautical miles) governs if there is a LOS or not, so T-TSAFE should be sensitive to that input.
Other results, such as the fact that T-TSAFE is relatively insensitive to the algorithms used for trajectory
prediction, are less intuitive. It may be that a more sophisticated exploration in which the trajectories of
the aircraft are signiﬁcantly varied would produce a diﬀerent result. Figure 7 shows the scatter plots for
numlos, supporting the results of the sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 7. Scatterplots for numlos
C. Uncertainty in Track Data
For this experiment, uncertainties in the measured track data of both aircraft were analyzed. These track
data are generally obtained by measurements of ATC radar and can be sources of substantial errors and
uncertainties.
These data are time series data and a number of diﬀerent possibilities exist to perturb them for uncertainty
analysis. Here, we pick a simple, yet relevant mechanism: each of the track data are oﬀset by a given, ﬁxed
bias. Such a perturbation can, for example, correspond to a systematic bias in the radar-based altitude
measurements.
More speciﬁcally, for this experiment, we modiﬁed the altitude by a uniformly distributed time-constant
bias δ ∈ {−1000ft, 1000ft} for each aircraft. Figure 8 shows the behavior of TTSAFE over the bias δAC1
and δAC2. The nominal case is thus in the middle of this ﬁgure. Individual trials are shown in magenta for
numlos < 4 (i.e., no losses detected), red for 4 ≤ numlos < 7, and blue otherwise. Obviously the triangular
shapes are caused by the geometry of the scenario: if the bias causes the aircraft be too far away from each
other vertically, then fewer losses are detected. The asymmetry between AC1 and AC2 might be of interest
for further investigation as well as a “red” region surrounded by blue in the vicinity of δAC1 = −800...− 300
and δAC2 = −200...200.
A similar visualization for ttlos is shown in Figure 9. The same trials as discussed above show quite
a diﬀerent picture: ttlos keeps its nominal value except for a tiny area in the parameter space. Trials are
marked in red for ttlos < 0.5.
This small (appr. 125x125ft) area could be of interest for design and validation as it shows a high
sensitivity and is located in the “middle” of an otherwise smooth region. A zoomed-in plot is shown in
Figure 9 (right), revealing a triangular shape.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we show an initial uncertainty quantiﬁcation analysis for an air traﬃc management concept
of operation (T-TSAFE). This analysis shows that there is a wide variation in the eﬀect the input conﬁgu-
ration parameters have on the ability of T-TSAFE to detect losses of separation, as seen in Figure 6. It also
revealed an unexpected region of behavior that can be aﬀected by an altitude measurement bias, as shown
in Figure 8. We believe that these sorts of analyses are invaluable to the design and analysis of complex
systems, particularly those that are safety-critical.
In our future work, we plan to:
• extend current methodologies and perform further analysis for hybrid inputs consisting of continuous
and discrete parameters,
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Figure 8. Diﬀerent values of numlos over diﬀerent altitude biases for AC1 and AC2
• use this extended analysis technique to study additional TTSAFE outputs—e.g. estimated points of
LOS, aircraft conformance,
• perform uncertainty analyses for aircraft parameters such as weight and performance, e.g., study the
inﬂuence of weight on climb and descent speed,
• further study the inﬂuence of track uncertainty (time-series data),
• use multi-aircraft scenarios for the analysis of missed-alarm/false-alarm rates.
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